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power or operates merely as a procedural check upon the further use of
congressional contempt power, 4 lends itself to judicial perusal of the individual duty to further testify. If the witness, the legislature, and the
Attorney General desire the grant of immunity, the court still must consider the proof of probability before an order will be issued. 5 The timely
court hearing would lend form and order through a stabilizing procedure
allowing individual rights to be synchronized with the demands of representative government.
The hearing on the immunity grant is a feasible practice in which the
constitutional basis for government can be made operative. In the hearing
the individual's duty to testify may be established upon an individual,
ad hoc basis. A corresponding power of Congress to coerce incriminatory
answers can be extended for one witness and returned to its normal
scope. This utilization of the hearing recognizes that the legislative and
executive branches have decisions to make that are based on the political
expediency and immediacy of the need, and that the judiciary assumes
the burden of timely enforcement of rights under a living Constitution."
The interaction of interests in an impartial judicial hearing affords assurance that the most information will be gained with the least sacrifice of
individual rights.

THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS
Aliens, facing deportation, although ostensibly guaranteed due
process of law by the courts,' have in the past received strikingly little
54. It would be difficult to convincingly demonstrate that under the Immunity Act,
note 3 supra, in contrast to H.R. 780, the court was not to use judicial contempt power to
enforce orders issuing from both proceedings. It is believed significant that Representative Keating sponsored both the Act and the Bill. See Keating, supra note 23 at 223224.
55. In this manner the court may be best assured that "the immunity power is not
frittered away," It re Ullman, 128 F.Supp. 617, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), and that the "public necessities" do outweigh the private interests. Barsky v. United States 167 F.2d 241,
249 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
56. See note 34 supra, and accompanying text.
1. United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103
(1927) ; United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923) ; Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). "[T]his court has never held, nor must we now be
understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a
statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that
inhere in 'due process of law'.

.

.

." Id. at 100.

Sometimes the courts while speaking

in terms of due process have actually done little more than rubber-stamp the action of
the agency enforcing the deportation laws. "It is true that she [petitioner] pleads a
want of knowledge of our language; that she did not understand the nature and import
of the questions propounded to her; that the investigation made was a 'pretended' one;

NOTES
protection of their individual rights in administrative deportation proceedings. 2 Recently, because of the continued recognition of the penal
character of deportation' coupled with a growing concern, both within
and without the courts, over violations of individual rights by uncontrolled and nonreviewable administrative action,4 there has been some
judicial attempt to afford the alien more fundamental fairness in deportation proceedings.' This effort to achieve a fairer harmony between
society's interest in ridding itself of undesirables and the alien's interest
in personal security has been but partially successful.
The United States Supreme Court in recent months has had occasion to scrutinize the deportation process at three different stages: the
hearing,' judicial review of deportation orders,7 and judicial review of
the Attorney General's discretionary power to suspend deportation.8 The
and that she did not, at the time, know that the investigation had reference to her being
deported from the country. These considerations cannot justify the intervention of the

courts." Id. at 101.
2. "The record discloses a very lax regard for the fundamentals of a fair hearing.
Much is tolerated in such proceedings, and that toleration has apparently borne its fruits.
We will not say that we can put our finger on this or that to reverse, but the attitude of
the examiner, the introduction of confused and voluminous evidence taken elsewhere, the
strong indications that the appellant was vaguely regarded as undesirable, and that deportation was thought the easiest way to get rid of him and to avoid the normal processes of law-all these warn us of the dangers inherent in a system where prosecutor
and judge are one and the ordinary rules which protect the accused are in abeyance. It
is apparent how easy is the descent by short cuts to the disposition of cases without clear
legal grounds or evidence which rationally proves them. These are the essence of any
hearing in which the personal feelings of the tribunals are not to be substituted for prescribed standards." Learned Hand, United States ex rel. Iorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920, 922
(2d Cir. 1929). For material on the injustices in the deportation system see CLAR, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE (1931) ; OPPENHEIMER, REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEPORTATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1931) ;
VAN VLEcK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS (1932); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, Whom We Shall Welcome (1953).
3. Mr. Justice Brandeis said of deportation, "[I]t may result also in loss of both
property and life; or of all that makes life worth living." Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276, 284 (1922). "Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it
visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live
and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty-at times a most
serious one--cannot be doubted." Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
4. A brief and well documented history of the general concern over multiplying
and expanding federal administrative agencies which finally culminated in the passage
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011
(1952), is found in Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33, 36-41 (1950).
5. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), where the deportation order
was set aside because the agency misconstrued the statute and because the only supporting evidence was hearsay; and Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939), where the court
interpreted a statute so as to exclude the alien from a deportable class.
6. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
7. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
8. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955); United
States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
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advances in these cases toward better protecting the alien appear well
founded; however, where the Court has been insensitive to the alien's
interests, grave injustices persist.
Deportation Hearing.
The hearing is a vital phase of the deportation process; it is here
that the Government and the alien present their evidence as to the deportability of the alien under the statute.9 The 1952 Immigration Act and
the Attorney General's regulations implementing the Act both contain
provisions to assure fairness at the hearing."0 However, there is one
gross deficiency in these hearing provisions; the hearing officer who is
responsible for prosecuting the case instigated by his superiors for the
purpose of deporting the alien is asked also to fairly weigh both sides
of the evidence and give his impartial judgment on the merits." Even
the most circumspect person in such a situation would tend to be unconsciously biased in favor of the Government. 2 It is difficult to conceive
how this procedure can adequately protect the alien's interest.
One of the prime motives of Congress in passing the Administrative
Procedure Act" was to eliminate this agency practice of combining prose9. Immigration and Nationality Act § 242 (b), 66

STAT.

209, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252 (b)

(1952). For a general analysis of the Act see Note, 66 HARV. L. REv. 643 (1953).
10. "Proceedings before a special inquiry officer . . . shall be in accordance with
such regulations . . . as the Attorney General shall prescribe. Such regulations shall
include requirements that"(1) the alien shall be given notice, reasonable under all the circumstances, of the
nature of the charges against him and of the time and place at which the proceedings
will be held;
"(2) the alien shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the
Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall
choose;
"(3) the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against
him, to present evidence in his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by
the Government; and
"(4) no decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence." 66 STAT. 209, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252 (b) (1)-(4)
(1952).
The Attorney General's implementing regulations are found in 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.51242.53 (1952).
11. "A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this section to determine the deportability of any alien, and shall administer oaths, present and receive
evidence, interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien or witnesses, and, as authorized by the Attorney General, shall make determinations, including order of deportation."
66 STAT. 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b) (1952). See also 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.53 (a)-(c), 242.61
(a), (c) (1952).
12. "It is hard to defend the fairness of a practice that subjects judges to the power
and control of prosecutors. Human nature has not put an impassable barrier between
subjection and subserviency, particularly when job security is at stake." Mr. Justice
Black in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 319 (1955) (dissent). See also Note, 5 STAN.
L. REV. 722 (1953).
13. 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1952).

NOTES

cutor and judge.'4 Section 11 of the Act provides for appointment of
hearing examiners who are separate and independent of prosecuting officers and others in the agency who might influence their decisions." :
The applicability of the hearing sections of APA6 to deportation proceedings under the 1917 Immigration Act' came before the Supreme
Court in 1950 in the case of Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath." The Court
held that these sections of APA applied to deportation. Six months
after the Sung case Congress passed a statute specifically exempting
deportation proceedings from the hearing provisions of APA."9 Thus
the Sung case was legislatively overruled before it could have any real
impact on the law, and the potential deportee's rights were again placed
in the hands of the prosecutor-judge.
The 1952 Immigration Act repealed the 1917 Act and the amendment which expressly exempted deportation proceedings from the hearing
provisions of APA. 2' The APA is applicable to any subsequent legislation unless that legislation is expressly exempted,"2 and the language of
the 1952 Act did not specifically exempt deportation from APA. The
question of whether Congress had reversed itself and in effect reinstated
the Sung case was recently resolved in .i1farcello v. Bonds.2 ' By directly
comparing the hearing sections of APA to the hearing provisions of
the 1952 Act the Court found that the 1952 Act "expressly supersedes
the hearing provisions of that Act [APA]."'"
14. Mr. Justice Jackson points this out in a brief, well documented comment on the
legislative history of APA in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41-45 (1950).
See also Federal Trial Examiners Conference v. Ramspeck, 104 F.Supp. 734, 737-38

(D.C. D.C. 1952).
15. ". . . there shall be appointed by and for each agency

. . . qualified and competent examiners . . . who . . . shall perform no duties inconsistent with their duties
and responsibilities as examiners. Examiners shall be removable by the agency in which
they are employed only for good cause established and determined by the Civil Service
Commission . . . after opportunity for hearing and upon the record thereof. Examiners
shall receive compensation prescribed by the Commission independently of agency recommendations or ratings. . . ." 60 STAT. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1010 (1952).
16. Administrative Procedure Act §§ 5, 7, 8, 11, 60 STAT. 239, 241, 242, 244 (1946),
5 U.S.C. §§ 1004, 1006, 1007, 1010 (1952).
17. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, c. 29, 39 STAT. 874.
18. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
19. Act of Sept. 27, 1950, c. 1052, 64 STAT. 1048.
20. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 403 (13), (47), 66 STAT. 279 (1952).
21. "No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions
of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly." Administrative Procedure Act § 12, 60 STAT. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1011 (1952).
22. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
23. Id. at 310. The court relied heavily on the fact that the hearing provisions of
the 1952 Act, while following the basic pattern of APA, varied substantially from APA
in some respects, notably the provisions of § 242 (b) of the 1952 Act, note 11 supra,
which vest both prosecuting and adjudicating functions in the hearing officer, a practice
which was prohibited by APA.
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This result is unfortunate. The dissenting view that the 1952 Act
provides no express supersession of APA and that Congress intended
APA to apply to deportation hearings is certainly more consistent with
fairness and protection of the alien's rights.24 Candor and impartiality
in the hearing, essential to a proper administration of the deportation
law, cannot be fully attained as long as the existing prosecutor-judge
practice is allowed to continue. Since the Court has held the hearing
provisions of APA inapplicable to deportation because of the wording
of the 1952 Immigration Act,25 it would now appear incumbent upon
Congress to amend the 1952 Act to make these provisions apply.
Judicial Review of Deportation Orders: Form of Review.
The 1917 Immigration Act provided that in every case where an
alien was ordered deported under the Act, "the decision of the Secretary
of Labor shall be final."2 The courts held that this provision had the
effect of prohibiting judicial intervention except as constitutionally required to satisfy the due process of law.2" Habeas corpus to test the
validity of the deportation order under which the alien was being detained was the only available attack,2" and this placed a considerable
burden on the alien, since to petition for a writ of habeas corpus he had
to be in the custody of the Immigration Service.
The judicial review section of APA provides that "the form of proceeding for judicial review shall be . . . any applicable form of legal

action (including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus).in any court of compe24. "The idea of letting a prosecutor judge the very case he prosecutes or supervises and control the job of the judge before whom his case is presented is wholly inconsistent with our concepts of justice. It was this principle on which Congress presumably acted in passing the Procedure Act." 349 U.S. 302, 318 (1955) (dissent).
25. The court stressed the points that § 242 (b) of the Act vested in the hearing
officer the dual functions of prosecutor and judge and that the same section stated, "The
procedure [herein prescribed] shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining
the deportability of an alien under this section." 66 STAT. 210, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)

(1952).
26. 39

STAT.

890. Under the 1917 Immigration Act the Secretary of Labor was

charged with enforcing the immigration and deportation laws. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service was transferred from the Secretary of Labor to the Department

of Justice to be administered by the Attorney General in 1940 by a presidential reorganization plan. Reorganization Plan No. V, 54 STAT. 230, 1238.
27. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1953) ; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135 (1945) ; United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S.
103 (1927) ; United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923).
28. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953) ; Kabadian v. Doak, 65 F.2d 202 (D.C.
Cir. 1933) ; Darabi v. Northrup, 54 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1931) ; Fafalios v. Doak, 50 F.2d

640 (D.C. Cir 1931).
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tent jusidiction." The question of whether this section applied to deportation proceedings under the 1917 Act so as to grant the alien forms of
judicial review in addition to habeas corpus came before the United
0 The Court concluded
States Supreme Court in Heikkila v. Barber."
that because of the long and consistent line of cases holding that the 1917
Act precluded any judicial review other than that which was constitutionally mandatory, it was a statute within the exception to section 10:
"Except so far as . . .statutes preclude judicial review .... "s

corpus, therefore, remained the only means of judicial review.

Habeas

2

When it considered the effect of section 10 APA on the 1952 Act,
which contained an almost verbatim re-enactment of the "final" clause
of the 1917 Act," the Court held in Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro4 that the
Heikkild case was not controlling and that review under this section was
available." As a result the alien may now test the deportation order by
methods other than habeas corpus. 6 This means that the alien is no
longer required to submit to the custody of the Immigration Service to
bring his action. However, this is probably the only real advantage the
alien gains by having available new forms of action. The rule that administrative remedies must be exhausted before a court will take juris29.

(1952).

Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60

STAT.

243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009

30. 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
31. 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1952).
32. The Court carefully pointed out that it was not in this case considering the
applicability of § 10 to the 1952 Immigration Act which took effect after Heikkila's action was commenced. Heikkila v. Barbara, 345 U.S. 229, 232 n. 4 (1953).
33. The 1917 Act provided, "In every case where any person is ordered deported
from the United States under the provisions of this Act, or of any law or treaty, the
decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be final." 39 STAT. 890.
The 1952 Act provides, "In any case in which an alien is ordered deported from the
United States under the provisions of this Act, or of any other law or treaty, the decision of the Attorney General shall be final." 66 STAT. 210, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b) (1952).
34. 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
35. The Court examined the legislative history of the 1952 Act and determined that
it had been the intent of Congress to make full judicial review under § 10 APA applicable to the Act. The ambiguous word "final" in the 1952 Act was construed as referring only to finality in the administrative process and not as a limitation on judicial
review. Id. at 51. The Court then rested its conclusion on the fact that since the 1952
Act was "subsequent legislation," and contained no language which "expressly" established a more limited review than that granted by § 10 APA, the 1952 Act was within
the provision of § 12 APA, ibid., which provides that, "no subsequent legislation shall be
held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such
legislation shall do so expressly." 60 STAT. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1011 (1952).
36. The Court specifically held, ". . . that there is a right of judicial review of
deportation orders other than by habeas corpus and that the remedy sought here is an
appropriate one." 349 U.S. 48, 52 (1955).
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diction over a case 7 will prevent the alien from obtaining declaratory
judicial determination of his status at an early stage on the mere threat
of impending deportation proceedings. He will still have to receive an
adverse decision from the administrative hearing officer and then exhaust his administrative appeals before gaining access to the courts.
Judicial Review of Deportation Orders: Scope of Review.
Historically a deportation order would be set aside by the courts
only if the alien had been denied due process of law,3" in which case his
detention would be illegal and the writ of habeas corpus would issue to
secure his release." Errors which would render a deportation order void
were: that the Commissioner of Immigration had exceeded his statutory
authority in ordering deportation,4" that the hearing was not a fair one,"
or that the hearing officer had committed an error of law in reaching his
decision.42 It was not necessary that there be substantial evidence supporting the administrative finding; "some evidence" was deemed adequate.43 The court did not consider the preponderance or credibility of
37. This rule is now embodied in § 10 (c) APA, ". . . every final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to judicial
review. Any preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly
reviewable shall be subject to review upon the review of the final agency action." 60
STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (c) (1952) ; Florentine v. Landon, 206 F.2d 870 (9th
Cir. 1953) ; United States ex rel. Zdunic v. Uhl, 144 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Haymes
v. Landon, 115 F. Supp. 506, (S.D. Cal. 1953); Scholnick v. Clark, 81 F. Supp. 298
(D.C. D.C. 1948) ; accord, United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904).
38. See note 27 supra.
39. See note 28 supra.
40. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915); Espino
v. Wixon, 136 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1943).
41. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) ; Sibray v. United States ex rel. Plichta,
282 Fed 795 (3d Cir. 1922) ; cf. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953);
Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908).
42. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) ; Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22
(1939).
43. "In these habeas corpus proceedings we do not review the evidence beyond ascertaining that there is some evidence to support the deportation order." Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 149 (1945) ; ". . . a want of due process is not established by
showing merely that the decision is erroneous, . . . or that incompetent evidence was
received and considered. Upon a collateral review in habeas corpus proceedings, it is
sufficient that there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative
tribunal could be deduced. . . ." United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of
Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927) ; ". . . it is well settled that . . . we do not
review the evidence beyond ascertaining that there is some evidence to support the deportation order. . . ." United States ex rel. Doukas v. Wiley, 160 F.2d 92, 95 (7th Cir.
1947) ; "The court is without authority to weigh the evidence or to substitute its judgment as to the merits of the controversy. . . ." United States ex rel. Karpathiou v.
Schlotfeldt, 106 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1939).
See Hyun v. Landon, 219 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1955) where the court sustained a deportation order based solely on two questionable depositions alleging the alien's past
Communist Party membership. The depositions were taken in Hawaii where the alien
was financially unable to be represented. Bhagat Singh v. McGrath, 104 F.2d 122 (9th

NOTES

the evidence, and was not required to weigh the alien's contravening evidence. Its only duty was to ascertain whether there was any evidence
tending to support the charge, and whether the charge, if established, was
one that justified deportation. 4 This rule, coupled with the fact that the
hearing officer was the prosecutor, furnished the inherent possibility for
the subjection of the alien to unjust treatment.
The Pedreiro case should make a substantial change in the scope of
review. While the bare holding goes only to the form of review under section 10 (b) APA45 the entire tenor of the case leads to the almost inevitable conclusion that the whole of section 10, including the broad scope of
review provided in section 10 (e), is now available to the potential deportee.4 At least one court has reasoned that, since the Pedreiro case
Cir. 1939). In this case the court sustained a deportation order based on depositions
taken in the absence of the alien.
44. Ex parte Mitchell, 256 Fed. 229, 234 (N.D.N.Y. 1919).
45. See note 36 supra.
46. In the Heikkila case the Court's reason for holding that § 10 APA was not
available to aliens under the 1917 Act was that the 1917 Act, as construed by a long
line of cases, was an act which precluded judicial review within the first exception to
§ 10 APA. See note 31 supra and accompanying text. However in the Pedreiro case
the court found that the 1952 Act was not an act which precluded judicial review; on
the contrary they found that the legislative history of the act supported the view that
aliens had a ". . . right to full judicial review of [a] deportation order." 349 U.S. 48,
52 (1955). Since the 1952 Act is not an act which precludes judicial review, it is not
within the exception to § 10 APA, and the only logical conclusion is that § 10 applies in
full. This conclusion is strongly supported by other language from the opinion: "The
Government contends that we should . . . give the word 'final' in the 1952 Act precisely the same meaning Heikkila gave 'final' in the 1917 Act and thereby continue to deprive deportees of all right of judicial review except by habeas corpus. We cannot accept this contention.
"Such a restrictive construction . . . would run counter to § 10 and § 12 of the
Administrative Procedure Act. Their purpose was to remove obstacles to judicial review of agency action under subsequently enacted statutes like the 1952 Immigration
Act. . . . [T]he Procedure Act is to be given a 'hospitable' interpretation. It is more
in harmony with the generous review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act to
construe the ambiguous word 'final' in the 1952 Immigration Act as referring to finality
in administrative procedure rather than as cutting off the right of judicial review in
whole or in part.
"The legislative history of both the Administrative Procedure Act and the 1952 Immigration Act supports respondent's right to full judicial review of this deportation
order. While the latter Act was under consideration in the House an amendment was
proposed which provided for liberal judicial review of deportation orders. Representative Walter assured the House that the proposed amendment was not needed. He said:
'Now, we come to this question of finality of the decision of the Attorney General. That
language means that it is a final decision as far as the Administrative branch of the
Government is concerned, but it is not final in that it is not the last remedy the alien
has. Section 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act is applicable.' [98 CONG. REC.
4416 (1952).] . . . Senator McCarran assured the Senat6 that 'the Administrative Procedure Act is made applicable to the bill.' [98 CONG. REC. 5778 (1952).] It is argued
that these assurances by the chairmen of the committees in charge of the bills were but
isolated statements and that other legislative history is sufficient to refute them. We
cannot agree." 349 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1955).
Thus while the court did not have to consider the applicability of § 10 (e) in the
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allows the alien to bring his action either by habeas corpus or by petition
for judicial review under the APA, the scope of review under either
47
method is the same.
Section 10 (e) provides that agency action will be set aside if it is:
"(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right."4 The alien gains little by these
provisions inasmuch as the narrow review allowed in habeas corpus already reached these errors.4" However, the balance of section 10 (e)
affords the alien substantial benefits.
Section 10 (e) (4) requires agency action to be set aside if it is
"without observance of procedure required by law."5 This would seem
to require the Attorney General to follow precisely the procedures set
out in the 1952 Act and in the Attorney General's own regulations implementing that act, since these regulations have been held to have the
force and effect of law.51 The 1952 Act states that "no decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial,
and probative evidence." 52 If the alien can reach this section of the 1952
Act by applying section 10 (e) (4) APA, he will have a far more effective test of the government's evidence than was available under the prior
"some evidence" rule.53
Section 10 (e) (5) requires setting aside of agency action "unsupported by substantial edivence." 4 The Supreme Court construed this
decision of this case, it is inconceivable that they could find it inapplicable in a later
case after their strong reliance on the quoted portion of the legislative history which
states that § 10 applies to deportation.
47. United States ex rel. Brzovich v. Holton, 222 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1955).
48. 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1009 (e) (1)-(3) (1952).
49. See notes 40, 41, 42 supra and accompanying text.
50. 60 STAT. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1009 (e) (4) (1952).
51. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
52. 66 STAT. 210, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b) (4) (1952).
53. The quoted portion of the 1952 Act, note 52 supra and accompanying text, is
written as a directive to the Attorney General to be included in his implementing procedural regulations for hearing officers, see note 10 supra, and not as a standard for the
courts to follow in judicial review. Therefore it is doubtful whether a court would feel
free to apply this standard directly in reviewing the evidence supporting the deportation
order. However a court should now be able to reach this standard through the medium
of § 10 (e) (4) APA. See United States ex rel. Brzovich v. Holton, 222 F.2d 840 (7th
Cir. 1955), where the court, on the basis of the expanded scope of review allowed by the
Pedreiro case, applies this "r~asonable, substantial, and probative" standard in setting
aside a deportation order based on insufficient evidence.
54. 60 STAT. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (e) (5) (1952). The full text of this
subsection is, "unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to the requirements of sections 7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute." Ibid. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), held that deporta-
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subsection in Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board.5" It was held that in determining whether an administrative order
is supported by substantial evidence a court should take into account
whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the evidence
and is precluded from sustaining an order merely on the basis of evidence
which in and of itself justifies the order without taking into account
contradictory evidence, or evidence from which conflicting inferences
could be drawn. Section 10 (e) also provides that "in making the foregoing determinations the court shall review the whole record, or such
portions thereof as may be cited by any party, and due account shall be
taken of the rule of prejudicial error." 6 Thus, the courts are in a position to exercise an effective check on the administrative process down
to and including the conduct of the deportation hearings.
Judicial Review of the Attorney General's DiscretionaryPower to
Suspend Deportation.
Prior to 1940 the law required deportation of all aliens found to be
in a deportable status regardless of the hardship to the alien or his dependents. " To alleviate this situation Congress granted the Attorney
General the power to suspend deportation in certain classes of cases.5"
The 1952 Immigration Act contains similar provisions," and in both
acts suspension of deportation is discretionary with the Attorney General."0 The problem of what judicial review, if any, can be granted when
tion proceedings were not subject to the requirements of §§ 7 and 8 AFA. However, §
10 (e) (5) APA would still appear applicable to deportation proceedings because the
agency hearing is now provided for by § 242 (b) of the 1952 Immigration Act, 66 STAT.
209, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b) (1952), although no hearing was required by the 1917 Act, 39

874.
55. 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951).
56. 60 STAT. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (e) (1952).
57. Immigration Act of 1924, c. 190, § 14, 43 STAT. 162; Act of Feb. 5, 1917, c. 29,
§ 19, 39 STAT. 889.
58. Act of June 28, 1940, c. 439, § 20 (c) (2), 54 STAT. 672
69. 66 STAT. 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1952).
60. The 1940 amendment provided, "In the case of any alien . . . who is deportable . . . and who has proved good moral character for the preceding five years, the
Attorney General may . . . suspend deportation . . . if he finds that such deportation
would result in serious economic detriment to a citizen or legally resident alien who is
the spouse, parent, or minor child of such deportable alien." 54 STAT. 672. Aliens who
were deportable as subversives, criminals, prostitutes, or narcotics violators were inSTAT.

eligible for suspension. Ibid.
The 1952 Act provides ". . . the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend
deportation . . . in the case of an alien who . . . is a person of good moral character;

and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result
in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent or
child, who is a citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." 66 STAT.
214, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1952).
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the Attorney General refuses suspension to an alien who is admittedly
eligible for it under the statute has given the courts considerable difficulty. Some courts have analogized the discretionary suspension power
of the Attorney General to the pardoning power of the executive, and
have indicated that it is not subject to any judicial review even if the Attorney General would refuse to consider the application for suspension.6
The majority of cases, however, take the position that the statute confers
upon the eligible alien a right to have the Attorney General exercise his
discretion on the application for suspension. These cases hold that the
power, although discretionary, cannot be exercised ir an arbitrary manner,
and that the court can compel correction of a failure to exercise, or of an
abuse of, discretion, although the court will not substitute its own discretion for that of the Attorney General.62 The courts which have adopted
The 1952 Act extends relief to criminals, subversives, prostitutes, and narcotics violators. An alien applying for suspension must show that he has been present for a continuous period of ten years if deportable for certain serious charges and for seven or
five years if deportable for less serious reasons. Ibid.
The Senate Judiciary Committee explained the replacement of the words "serious
economic detriment" in the 1940 Amendment by the words "exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship." "The committee is aware that in almost all cases of deportation,
hardship and frequently unusual hardship is experienced by the alien or members of his
family. . . . The committee is aware too, of the progressively increasing number of
cases in which aliens are . . . gaining admission into the United States illegally or ostensibly as nonimmigrants but with the intention of establishing themselves in a situation in which they may subsequently have access to some administrative remedy to adjust
their status to that of permanent residents. This practice is grossly unfair to aliens who
await abroad their turn on the quota waiting lists and who are deprived of their quota
numbers in favor of aliens who indulge in the abuse. This practice is threatening our
entire immigration system and the incentive for the practice must be removed. The bill
accordingly establishes a policy that the administrative remedy should be available only
in the very limited category of cases in which the deportation of the alien would be unconscionable." S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1952).
61. Sleddens v. Shaughnessy, 177 F.2d 363, 364 (2d Cir. 1949) ("suspension was a
matter of discretion . . . which the court was without power to review") ; United
States ex rel. Walther v. District Director of Immigration and Naturalization, 175 F.2d
693, 694 (2d Cir. 1949) ("discretionary unreviewable power"). See United States ex rel.
Zabadlija v. Garfinkel, 77 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
62. Thus a case has been remanded because the record failed to show whether or
not discretion had been exercised. Hatzistavrou v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir.
1955) ; another case was remanded for refusal to grant suspension, the court saying,
"Courts have no power to review administrative discretion when it is reasonably exercised. But, in appropriate circumstances, they can compel correction of an abuse of
discretion or can compel an officer to exercise his discretion where he has obviously
failed or refused to do so. Such an obvious refusal occurs, we think, when an official
sets up a class of cases as to which he refuses ever to exercise any discretion, one way
or the other, if that class is not rationally differentiated from other cases, not within
that class, where he uses his discretion case by case." Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy,
180 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir. 1950). Acosta v. Landon, 125 F.Supp. 434 (S.D. Cal. 1954) ;
Ex parte Mota Singh Chohan, 122 F.Supp. 851 (N.D. Cal. 1954) ; United States ex rel.
Adel v. Shaughnessy, 183 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1950) (dictum) ; United States e.v rel. Weddeke v. Watkins, 166 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1948) (dictum) ; Chavez v. McGranery, 108 F.
Supp. 255 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (dictum) ; accord, Application of Orlando, 131 F.Supp. 485

NOTES
this latter position have not delineated precisely what constitutes a failure
to exercise, or an abuse of, discretion, and, in view of the fact that the
statutory standards are not amenable to exact definition,6 3 it is doubtful
that any set formula could be developed which would be universally applicable. It appears that the courts in this area will have to proceed largely
on an ad hoc basis.
There seems to be no chance that section 10 APA will be held to
have any application to the suspension section of the 1952 Immigraiton
Act, even though the Pedreiro case holds that section 10 APA applies to
the 1952 Act generally. The exception clause of section 10 APA states
that the Act applies "Except so far as . . . (2) agency action is by law
committed to agency discretion."" The suspension section of the 1952
Immigration Act states, "As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the
Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation.
,6.5
Thus the suspension section of the 1952 Act appears to fall squarely
within section 10 (2) APA. Agency action by the 1952 Act is specifically
"committed to agency discretion;"" therefore the courts will not be able
to apply the comprehensive judicial review of section 10 APA to the
Attorney General's discretion to suspend deportation."7
Since the majority of courts appear willing to grant judicial review
of suspension to the extent of setting aside an abuse of discretion, the
further question arises as to what extent a refusal to grant suspension
may be based on confidential information outside the record. It is fundamental that a court cannot tell whether the Attorney General abused his
discretion if the decision is based on confidential information. Also, if
the alien is not allowed to examine such information, he has neither the
opportunity to discredit the source from which it came nor to prove that
(N.D.N.Y. 1954); United States ex rel. Giacalone v. Miller, 86 F.Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y.

1949).
63.

"...

the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation . . . of

an alien who . . . is a person of good moral character, . . . and is a person whose deportation would . . . result in exceptional and extremely 1nusnal hardship to the alien,
or to his spouse, parent or child ..
" 66 STAT. 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (a) (1) (1952).
(Emphasis added.)

64. 60

STAT.

243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (2) (1952).

65. 66 STAT. 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (a) (1952).
66. 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (2) (1952).
67. Full application of § 10 APA would probably not be desirable in this area since
a judicial requirement that the Attorney General's decision be based on substantial evidence would tend to eliminate any discretion on the part of the Attorney General and
substitute the discretion of the court. Sucha result was obviously not intended by Congress; if it had been, then the statute would not have conferred discretion on the Attorney General, but would simply have made suspension of deportation mandatory in cer-

tain classes of cases.

For a full discussion of the application of § 10 APA to administrative law generally,
see Davis Nonreviewable Administrative Action, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 749 (1948).
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the information is false. The sense of justice rebels at action taken
against a person on the basis of information which he has no opportunity
to examine; yet a number of courts have allowed a denial of suspension
of deportation to stand when it was based on such confidential information."8 Other courts have taken the position that the record must disclose
the reasons why suspension was denied." This latter view is certainly
the fairer of the two, and in the interest of justice is the one which should
be universally adopted by the courts.7"
It is to be noted that the Attorney General's regulations implementing the suspension section of the 1952 Act provide that the hearing officer initially or the Board of Immigration Appeals on appeal may predicate
the determination upon confidential information without disclosure thereof to the alien, if, in the opinion of the hearing officer or the board, the
disclosure of such information would be prejudicial to the public interest,
safety, or security.7 This regulation was held valid by the United States
Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, in Jay v. Boyd." This result is questionable on the basis of a denial of due process of law. 3 If suspension of
68. Jay v. Boyd, 224 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1955) ; United States ex reL. Matranga v.
Mackey, 210 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1954) ; United States ex reL. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy,
180 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1950); United States ex rel. Von Kleczkowski v. Watkins, 71
F.Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); cf. Chiu But Hao v. Barber, 222 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1955).
69. Hatzistavrou v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Maeztu v. Brownell,
132 F.Supp. 751 (D.C. D.C. 1955); Ex parte Mota Singh Chohan, 122 F.Supp. 851
(N.D. Cal. 1954); Alexiou v. McGrath, 101 F.Supp. 421 (D.C. D.C. 1951).
70. As aptly stated in a recent case, "There is no place in this Government in its
legislative, judicial or executive departments, for arbitrary action, and there is no way
to know whether such action is arbitrary or not, unless the basis upon which it is taken
is revealed." Maeztu v. Brownell, 132 F.Supp. 751, 753 (D.C. D.C. 1955).
71. 8 C.F.R. § 244.3 (1952).
72. 224 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1955).
73. The Attorney General's regulations provide that the alien shall have a hearing
on his application for suspension. 8 C.F.R. § 242.61 (a) (1952). The Board of Immigration Appeals is required upon the alien's request to grant the alien a hearing on
appeal. Id. at § 6.1 (e). A fundamental attribute of a fair hearing is that the party
proceeded against have an opportunity to examine and rebut evidence introduced against
him. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920). One district court in remanding
a case denying discretionary relief has said, "the hearing on eligibility for suspension is
tainted . . . with unfairness, because evidence not of record was considered. But for
that evidence it is wholly speculative whether the requisite finding would have been
made. The charge of lack of due process cannot be avoided. . . . For the reason, therefore, that a fair hearing was not accorded plaintiff . . . she is entitled to have the case
remanded to the Immigration and Naturalization Service for a decision on the evidence
on the record alone." Alexiou v. McGrath, 101 F.Supp. 421, 424 (D.C. D.C. 1951). In
a somewhat analogous area it has been recently held that the Department of State in the
exercise of its discretion to grant or deny a passport may not base a denial on unrevealed
confidential information.
"The right to a quasi-judicial hearing must mean more than the right to permit an
applicant to testify and present evidence. It must include the right to know that the
decision will be reached upon evidence of which he is aware and can refute directly.
"Confidential information is of unquestionable importance to executive officers in
performing their duties, but it should be confined for use in obtaining factual data which
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deportation can be denied on the basis of confidential information, the
door is open for both error and arbitrary administrative action. Fairness
to the alien dictates that the reasons for denial of suspension of deportation be based on information contained in the record.
The question of the procedure by which the Attorney General may
exercise his discretion in granting suspension of deportation was before
the United States Supreme Court in 1954 and again in 1955 in the case
of United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy. 4 The petitioner, Accardi, alleged that the Board of Immigration Appeals had prejudged his
application for suspension because of his inclusion on a list of "unsavory
characters" whom the Attorney General desired deported. Accardi alleged
that the Attorney General had, in effect, dictated the board's decision.
The Court reversed the case on the basis of this allegation, holding that
the board was required by the Attorney General's own regulations, when
considering appeals, to exercise its independent discretion and judgment
without influence from the Attorney General."5 If Accardi could prove
that the board had not exercised its own understanding and conscienece
in determining his case, he was entitled to a new hearing."6
Although the law in the area of judicial review of the Attorney
General's discretionary power to suspend deportation is not entirely setmay itself be used of record. When the basis of action by any branch of the Government remains hidden from scrutiny and beyond practical review' the seeds of arbitrary
and irresponsible government are sown." Boudin v. Dulles, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 2231 (D.C.

D.C. 1955).
74. 347 U.S. 260 (1954); 349 U.S. 280 (1955).
75. 8 C.F.R. § 90.3 (c) (1949) ; See 8 C.F.R. §§ 6.1 (d) (1) (2) (1952).
The four dissenting justices were of the opinion that Congress had vested discretion
as to suspension of valid deportation orders in the Attorney General alone, and that even
a refusal by the Attorney General to exercise that discretion was not reviewable by the
courts. The minority felt that suspension of deportation was analogous to an executive
act of grace and was ". . . a discretionary and purely executive function" which was
not subject to judicial review. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S.
260, 271 (1954).
The minority view is certainly too narrow. It would not guarantee the alien any
enforceable right to the exercise of discretion provided by the statute. The majority
opinion guarantees the alien a right to the procedure provided by the Attorney General's
regulations for the exercise of the discretion and grants him the right to a fair hearing
before the board, which must exercise its own independent judgment on the merits of
the case.
76. On remand the District Court found as a fact that although some of the board
members had known of Accardi's inclusion on the Attorney General's program, they had
not been influenced by it, and had reached their individual decisions on the merits free
from any dictation. The District Court dismissed the writ. See Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280, 82 (1955). The Court of Appeals reversed, basing
its conclusion on the ground that the board members had been "unconsciously" biased
against Accardi. 219 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1955). The Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the District Court, holding that the
District Court's determination that the board members were not influenced was sufficient to satisfy the Supreme Court's original opinion, and that Accardi had'failed to
prove his case and was therefore not entitled to a new hearing. 349 U.S. 280 (1955).
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tled, the Accardi and other recent cases show that the courts are attempting
to better protect the alien's interests. These courts have apparently
adopted a position analogous to their position prior to APA in habeas
corpus review of deportation orders entered under the 1917 Act. The
courts are seeking to insure the alien due process of law by protecting
him from arbitrary administrative action, but at the same time they are
not willing to grant any comprehensive review of the Attorney General's
discretion. The view that the Attorney General's determination must not
be arbitrary or an abuse of discretion appears to be merely another way
of stating that it must be based on some evidence. This is probably the
best position for the courts to adopt in this difficult area in which there
is an inherent impossibility of framing precise, prior standards for the
granting of suspension"? and where, in the final analysis, it is necessary
that discretion be exercised on an individual case basis to determine who
should be deported and who should remain. More comprehensive judicial
review would tend to substitute the discretion of the court for that of the
Attorney General and would certainly do violence to the statute wherein
Congress specifically vests this function in the Attorney General;"s a
lesser quantum of judicial review would leave the alien without court
protection of his individual interests, and would place him almost entirely
at the mercy of the administrative agency.
Conclusion.
The individual interests of potential deportees have not in the past
been adequately protected. Recent cases show that the courts are now
becoming more interested in safeguarding these interests, and significant
steps have been taken in this direction. The Supreme Court has held that
the judicial review section of APA is applicable to deportation proceedings." A vigorous application of this section by the courts should go far
toward guaranteeing the alien adequate judicial review of administrative
action. The Court has also held that the alien is entitled to a fair and
impartial hearing on his application for suspension of a deportation
order.80 While the law is still unsettled in this difficult area, a significant
number of lower federal courts are attempting to work out rules which
will more adequately protect the alien's interests.8 The greatest affront
to fair play in the deportation process is the combination of the duties of
77. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
78. See note 60 supra.
79. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
80. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
81. See notes 62, 69 supra and accompanying text.
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prosecutor and judge in one person at the deportation hearing. Unfortunately, the Court has receitly upheld this union of functions." This
practice should be abolished, and the hearing provisions of APA should
be held applicable to deportation. If this is accomplished, and the courts
continue the trend toward protecting the alien in the area of the Attorney
General's discretion to suspend deportation, then a fair balance between
the public's interest in removal of undesirable people, and the alien's
interest in personal security will have been attained.

A CONSIDERATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS IN
AUTOMOBILE DEALER FRANCHISES
In the last three years, there has been a significant decline of automobile dealers' profits as a percent of sales.' Many dealers have gone
into bankruptcy; many others have voluntarily quit.2 The dealers allege
that unless they are helped, the result will be a loss to the public of retail
82.
1.

Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
Year
Profitsas a percent of sales
1949
5.8%
1950
6.3%
1951
4.9%
1952
3.6%
1953
2.2%
*1954
0.6%
*1955
2.6%
HEWITT, AUTMOBILE DEALERS FRANCHISES (unpublished thesis in Indiana University Library 1955) p. 228 citing figures compiled by the National Automobile Dealers
Association, hereinafter referred to as NADA.
* The figure for 1955 is based on the period from January 1 through September 30.
The figures for 1954 and 1955 are reported in The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 28, 1955,
p. 22, col. 2.
In appraising the significance of these figures, it must be remembered that the
profit on the dealership is computed after deduction of a salary to the dealer for managing the business. This is illustrated by the testimony of Harlow H. Curtice, president
of General Motors, before Senator O'Mahoney's Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee.
"(D)uring the post war period, G.M. dealers have had profits of over $5,000,000,000
after deducting over $1,000,000,000 of owners' salaries and bonuses." N.Y. Times, Dec.
3, 1955, § 1, p. 18, col. 4.
It is also important to note that this measure of profits does not take into account
increased profits resulting from larger volume and higher prices.
Mr. Hewitt's thesis has been of great value in the preparation of this Note. He has
compiled many important statistics and analyzed leading cases involving automobile
dealers.
2. There were 43,079 dealers in 1950; 45,248 in 1953; 43,340 in 1955. Automotive
Industries, March 15, 1955, p. 104.
From Oct. 1, 1952 through March 31, 1953, NADA reported over 3,200 dealers went
out of business. HEWIrr, op. cit. supra at 228.
Dun and Bradstreet figures show that there were 219 dealers' bankruptcies in 1953,
the highest number since 1938. Id. at 229.

